Financial Distress among the Elderly: Bankruptcy Reform and the Financial Crisis by Li, Wenli & White, Michelle J.
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Wharton Pension Research Council Working
Papers Wharton Pension Research Council
5-2-2019
Financial Distress among the Elderly: Bankruptcy
Reform and the Financial Crisis
Wenli Li
Michelle J. White
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/prc_papers
Part of the Economics Commons
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/prc_papers/533
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Li, Wenli and White, Michelle J., "Financial Distress among the Elderly: Bankruptcy Reform and the Financial Crisis" (2019). Wharton
Pension Research Council Working Papers. 533.
https://repository.upenn.edu/prc_papers/533
Financial Distress among the Elderly: Bankruptcy Reform and the
Financial Crisis
Abstract
Both the proportion of bankruptcy filings that are by the elderly and the proportion of foreclosure starts that
affect the elderly have increased dramatically over the past twenty years—suggesting an increase in financial
distress of the elderly relative to younger age groups. In this paper, we use new data to examine whether these
trends can be explained by either of two events: the 2005 bankruptcy reform and the 2008 financial crisis. Our
results show that while these events made both the elderly and younger age groups worse off, they do explain
the increase in relative financial distress of the elderly.
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   Both the proportion of bankruptcy filings that are by the elderly and the proportion of 
foreclosure starts that affect the elderly have increased dramatically over the past twenty years—
suggesting an increase in financial distress of the elderly relative to younger age groups.  In this 
paper, we use new data to examine whether these trends can be explained by either of two 
events:  the 2005 bankruptcy reform and the 2008 financial crisis.  Our results show that while 
these events made both the elderly and younger age groups worse off, they do explain the 
increase in relative financial distress of the elderly.   
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Bankruptcy filings by the elderly have increased dramatically as a proportion of filings 
overall:  data from the Consumer Bankruptcy Project show that the percent of all bankruptcy filings 
that are by the elderly increased six-fold over the past 25 years, from just 2 percent in 1991 to 12 
percent in 2013-16 (Thorne et al. 2018).  Our figures, based on a much larger sample but covering 
a shorter time period, show a doubling in the percent of filings by the elderly since 2000, from 6 
percent in 2000 to 12 percent in 2018.1  Some of the increase in bankruptcy filings by the elderly 
is simply due to aging of the US population, but the share of the elderly in the US population only 
increased by 19 percent over the period 2000-2018—much less than the rate of increase in the 
elderly share of bankruptcies.2  Thus the data suggest that there has been a disproportionate 
increase in financial distress of the elderly relative to the overall US population.      
Foreclosures are also a sign of severe financial distress for homeowners.  Although it is 
initiated by lenders rather than debtors, they generally occur when homeowners in financial 
distress cannot afford their mortgage payments.  Our data show that the share of the elderly in 
foreclosures also increased rapidly, from 6.8 percent in 2000 to 11 percent in 2018, for an increase 
of nearly two-thirds.3  This rise again suggests a disproportionate increase in financial distress of 
the elderly.    
This chapter examines the question of whether and why financial distress has increased 
among the elderly relative to the general population.  We focus on both bankruptcy filings and 
foreclosure starts as dual indicators of severe financial distress.  In particular, we examine whether 
two events that occurred during the period can explain the increase in elderly financial distress:  
the 2005 bankruptcy reform and the financial crisis that started in 2008.  The 2005 bankruptcy 
reform discouraged all debtors from filing for bankruptcy by raising the costs of filing and 
particularly discouraged debtors with above-median household incomes from filing by adding 
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additional obstacles.4  These changes made debtors worse off in general because discharge of debt 
in bankruptcy became less available.  It also increased foreclosures because filing for bankruptcy 
previously helped homeowners in financial distress save their homes by discharging non-mortgage 
debt (see Li, White and Zhu 2011; White and Zhu 2010).  Similarly, the financial crisis that started 
in 2008 increased financial distress because many workers lost their jobs, leading to increases in 
both bankruptcy filings and foreclosures.  Home prices also fell sharply, causing additional 
foreclosures because some homeowners chose to walk away from homes with underwater 
mortgages.  But whether bankruptcy reform and the financial crisis had stronger negative effects 
on the elderly than younger age groups is an open question.  We examine whether and how both 
events affected bankruptcy filings and foreclosure starts of the elderly relative to the general 
population.     
 
Bankruptcy Filings and Foreclosure Starts by the Elderly:  New Evidence 
Our data are taken from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York Consumer Credit 
Panel/Equifax Data (CCP), which is based on a 5 percent sample of US individuals who have 
Equifax credit reports. 5  We take a random sample of 5 percent of individuals in the CCP, so that 
our dataset is a random sample of 0.25 percent of all individuals with credit reports.  These data 
are reported quarterly and provide information concerning individuals’ debts, Equifax Risk Scores, 
age, and location at the zip code level.6  We also know each quarter whether an individual filed 
for bankruptcy or if lenders started foreclosure.7  We drop individuals from the sample in the 
quarter following a bankruptcy filing when we examine bankruptcy filings, and we drop 
individuals from the sample in the quarter following the start of foreclosure when we examine 
foreclosure starts.  Thus only the first bankruptcy filing or foreclosure start is considered.  In what 
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follows, we define the older population as persons age 65-85, versus the total population as those 
age 20-85.  Individuals younger than age 20 or older than 85 are dropped. 8    
Figure 1 shows bankruptcy filings and foreclosure starts of the elderly as a proportion of 
the total population from 2000 to 2018.  Here we see that the elderly shares of bankruptcies and 
foreclosures are closely correlated, especially from 2000 to 2011, but they tended to diverge after 
2012.  The elderly share of foreclosures peaked in 2012 and has declined since, while the elderly 
share of bankruptcies continued rising up to 2017.  
Figure 1 here 
Next we evaluate whether rising debt levels explain the increase in financial distress in the 
older population.  As a comparison group, we use all individuals age 45-64 which we refer to here 
as the ‘near-elderly;’ these people are a useful comparison set because their financial situations are 
closest to that of the elderly.  Like the elderly, the near-elderly tend to have declining debt levels 
over time, while younger individuals’ debt levels tend to increase over time.   
Figure 2 shows average bankcard (credit plus debit card) debt and average mortgage (first 
mortgage plus home equity loans) debt of the elderly, relative to the near-elderly.  Bankcard debt 
levels of the elderly relative to the near-elderly increased from 50 percent in 2000 to 66 percent in 
2018, or by one-third.  This reflects the fact that the near-elderly reduced their bankcard debt levels 
over the period, while the elderly did not.  Mortgage debt figures are based on averages for all 
individuals, including non-homeowners who do not have mortgages or home equity loans.  
Mortgage debt levels of the elderly relative to the near-elderly increased even faster than bankcard 
debt levels over the period, rising from 50 percent in 2000 to 78 percent in 2018, or by more than 
half.  Thus the relative increase in debt levels of the elderly are likely to be an important factor in 
explaining the increase in elderly financial distress.  Also the rise in the proportion of bankruptcy 
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filings and foreclosure starts of the elderly was larger than the rise in relative debt levels of the 
elderly, suggesting that marginal increases in debt led to large increases in elderly financial 
distress.   
Figure 2 here 
Overall, these figures suggest that there has been an increase in financial distress of the 
elderly relative to the non-elderly population, since 2000.  In the next two sections, we examine 
two possible causes of the increase in elderly financial distress--the bankruptcy reform of 2005 
and the financial crisis of 2008--and we test whether and to what extent they can explain the 
increase.    
  
Legal Background and Hypotheses 
Before 2005, US bankruptcy law was very favorable to debtors: all debtors were allowed 
to file for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 under which all of their unsecured debts could be 
discharged.  Debts that could be discharged in bankruptcy included credit card debts, unsecured 
installment debts, medical debts, past due rent and utility bills, and student loans.  (Secured debts 
such as car loans could not be discharged in bankruptcy unless the debtor gave up the collateral 
securing the loan.)  Future income was entirely exempt from the obligation to repay, and debtors 
were only required to repay from assets if their assets exceeded an exemption level set by their 
state of residence.   States have varying exemption levels for assets, ranging from very low to 
unlimited for equity in owner-occupied homes.  In states such as Florida and Texas that have 
unlimited exemptions for equity in owner-occupied homes, debtors who were homeowners could 
benefit financially from filing for bankruptcy even if they had both high incomes and high assets.  
Prior to 2005, a high fraction of US households could gain financially from filing for bankruptcy.9  
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There was also a separate bankruptcy procedure, Chapter 13, under which debtors could 
propose a plan to repay part of their debt from future earnings over 3 to 5 years.  Before 2005, 
debtors had the right to choose between filing under Chapter 7 or Chapter 13, and they were not 
obliged to repay more in Chapter 13 than the value of assets they would be obliged to give up in 
Chapter 7.  Accordingly, most debtors could file under Chapter 13 and propose a plan to repay 
only a token amount of debt, since they were not obliged to repay anything in Chapter 7.  Chapter 
13 also allowed some types of debts that were not dischargeable in Chapter 7—such as unpaid 
taxes—to be discharged or repaid over time under the plan.     
Filing for bankruptcy prior to 2005 also could help debtors who were homeowners avoid 
foreclosure.  Filing under Chapter 7 indirectly helped debtors keep their homes, because having 
unsecured debt discharged increased their ability to make their mortgage payments.  Filing under 
Chapter 13 helped debtors more directly, both because unsecured debt was discharged and because 
debtors could stop foreclosure and spread out repayment of mortgage arrears over the period of 
their repayment plans.  In addition, second mortgages could be discharged in Chapter 13 if they 
were completely underwater.  Filing under Chapter 13 also helped debtors avoid repossession of 
their cars and underwater car loans could be reduced to the market value of the car. 10  
The 2005 bankruptcy reform made bankruptcy much less favorable to debtors in general.   
First, the blanket exemption of future income from the obligation to repay was abolished for 
debtors with family incomes above the median level in their states.  These debtors are now obliged 
to take a ‘means test’ that determines whether they must file under Chapter 13 and, if so, provides 
a formula that determines how much of their future income must be used to repay.   The formula 
is based on Internal Revenue Service (IRS) procedures for collecting from delinquent taxpayers, 
although additional expenses are allowed.  The adoption of the means test thus reduced the gain 
6 
 
from filing for bankruptcy for debtors who had above-median income levels.  Second, the costs of 
filing for bankruptcy rose, because lawyers’ fees increased and because the reform imposed new 
requirements on debtors to pay for and take credit counselling and debt management courses.  
These changes discouraged many debtors from filing even if they had below-median income 
levels.11  Third, bankruptcy reform made some types of debts non-dischargeable in bankruptcy.  
Student loans were no longer discharged and car loans could no longer be reduced in bankruptcy 
to the market value of the vehicle. 12 
   These 2005 changes resulted in bankruptcy becoming both less beneficial to debtors in 
general, and less useful as a means for debtors to save their homes.  As a result, we predict both a 
fall in bankruptcy filing rates, and a rise in foreclosure rates following bankruptcy reform.  Of 
most interest in this chapter is how these predictions differ for the elderly relative to the non-
elderly, which depends on the net effect of a number of changes made by bankruptcy reform.  
Average levels of debt of all types tend to decline rapidly with age, starting around age 45.  This 
means that elderly debtors gain less than the non-elderly from filing for bankruptcy and, as a result, 
are predicted to be harmed less by bankruptcy reform.  In addition, income from Social Security 
is not counted in the means test that determines whether debtors must file under Chapter 13.  
Because only the elderly have social security benefits, this also means that they were harmed less 
than the non-elderly by bankruptcy reform: they are more likely to still qualify for Chapter 7.  
Finally, a uniform new asset exemption of $1 million for retirement accounts such as 401(k) plans 
was instituted under the 2005 bankruptcy reform.  Because the older population tends to have the 
largest amount of assets in retirement accounts, this new exemption made bankruptcy more 
attractive for the elderly relative to the non-elderly.  Yet many states already had high exemptions 
for retirement assets in bankruptcy, so that few elderly individuals had enough assets in retirement 
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accounts to be affected by the adoption of the new Federal exemption.  As a result, other factors 
would be predicted to be more important.  Overall, the 2005 bankruptcy reform can be predicted 
to have caused a smaller drop in bankruptcy filings by the elderly compared to the non-elderly, 
which means that the proportion of elderly bankruptcy filers would be predicted to have increased 
after 2005.       
Next we explore how foreclosure rates by the elderly versus the non-elderly might be 
predicted to respond to the bankruptcy reform.  Because homeowners use bankruptcy to avoid 
foreclosure and bankruptcy became less attractive after the reform, we predict a rise in foreclosure 
rates after 2005 for both the elderly and the non-elderly.  Yet as discussed above, the elderly have 
less mortgage debt on average than the non-elderly, and the reform discouraged them from filing 
by less than it discouraged the non-elderly.  Both of these factors imply that the foreclosure rate 
for the elderly would be predicted to rise by less than that of the non-elderly following the 2005 
reform.13      
Finally, we turn to the impact of the financial crisis.  Personal bankruptcy filings fell 
sharply after the 2005 bankruptcy reform—from 2 million in 2005 to 775,000 in 2007—before 
rising again after the start of the financial crisis in 2008—filings peaked at 1.5 million in 2010.  
Similarly, foreclosures rose quickly when the financial crisis began.  The increase in bankruptcies 
and foreclosures reflects both the decline in debtors’ incomes due to widespread job loss and the 
fall in housing prices that caused some homeowners to walk away from their homes since their 
mortgages were underwater after housing prices declined.   
How might we predict that the financial crisis affected the elderly relative to the non-
elderly?  The elderly receive social security income that remained unaffected by the financial 
crisis, and they were also less likely to lose their jobs because they were less likely to work in the 
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first place.  This implies that the elderly were harmed less by the financial crisis, so the increase 
in bankruptcy filings following the crisis would have been predicted to be less for the elderly than 
the non-elderly.  Similarly, elderly homeowners are less likely to have mortgages and have less 
mortgage debt than homeowners in general, meaning they were less likely to default on their 
mortgages after the financial crisis, both because they were less likely to be financially distressed, 
and because their mortgages were less likely to be underwater after the crisis.14   
     For these reasons, the 2005 bankruptcy reform is predicted to have reduced bankruptcy 
filings and increased foreclosure starts for all age groups, but the changes for the elderly would be 
predicted to be less than for the non-elderly.  Accordingly, we predict an increase in the proportion 
of older bankruptcy filers after 2005, but a reduction in the proportion of foreclosure starts 
affecting the elderly after 2005.  The 2008 financial crisis would be anticipated to boost both 
bankruptcies and foreclosures for all age groups, but by less for the elderly than other ages.  
Accordingly, our model predicts a relative decline in the proportion of both bankruptcies and 
foreclosures affecting the elderly after the financial crisis.  We test these predictions in the next 
sections.    
 
Summary statistics and difference-in-differences 
We estimate separate models explaining bankruptcy filings and foreclosure starts over the 
period of the 2005 bankruptcy reform and the 2008 financial crisis, using the data discussed above.  
Because we use the near-elderly as our comparison group for the elderly, we drop all observations 
of individuals older than age 85 or younger than age 45.   
Bankruptcy reform went into effect in the fourth quarter of 2005.15  For the analysis of the 
effect of bankruptcy reform, we drop the two quarters before and two quarters after the reform 
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occurred (2005Q2 through 2006Q1), because there was a rush to file before the reform went into 
effect and very few filings occurred just after the reform.  We end the sample period at the end of 
2007 in order to avoid including the beginning of the financial crisis in the analysis of bankruptcy 
reform.  Our time period for the analysis of bankruptcy reform therefore covers seven quarters 
before the reform, from 2003Q3 to 2005Q1, and seven quarters after, from 2006Q2 through 
2007Q4. The number of observations in the sample explaining bankruptcy filings before/after 
bankruptcy reform is 4.6 million, covering 338,000 distinct individuals.  For the analysis 
explaining foreclosure starts before/after bankruptcy reform, we restrict the sample to individuals 
who have positive mortgage debt. This sample has 1.8 million observations covering 160,000 
distinct individuals.   
Turning to the analysis of the financial crisis, we date the crisis to the first quarter of 2008 
and our sample period covers 2006Q3 through 2009Q4, or six quarters before and eight quarters 
after the crisis.  We start the sample period at 2006Q3 to avoid including the period before 
bankruptcy reform.   Sample sizes are similar to those used to explain bankruptcy filings and 
foreclosure starts before/after bankruptcy reform.  (Appendix Table 1 reports summary statistics 
for both samples.) 
First we calculate simple difference-in-differences reported in Table 1. Here the top panel 
gives annual bankruptcy filing rates before versus after the 2005 bankruptcy reform for the elderly 
versus the near-elderly.  The filing rate for the elderly in the pre-reform period was 0.35 percent 
per year, while the filing rate for the near-elderly was more than twice as high at 0.84 percent per 
year.  Thus the elderly filed for bankruptcy much less often than the near-elderly, presumably 
because they have less debt.  Filing rates fell sharply after bankruptcy reform for both groups, but 
the drop was 0.19 percentage points for the elderly versus the much larger figure of 0.50 percentage 
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points for the near-elderly. Because the drop for the elderly was smaller, the difference-in-
difference is positive and large:  0.33 percentage points, which is nearly as large as the pre-reform 
bankruptcy filing rate of the elderly.  The fact that the difference-in-difference is positive accords 
with our prediction that the 2005 bankruptcy reform caused the proportion of bankruptcy filings 
by the elderly to increase.     
Table 1 here 
In the bottom panel of Table 1, we offer the same calculations for foreclosure rates before 
versus after the 2005 bankruptcy reform.  The foreclosure rate for the elderly rose slightly from 
0.42 percent per year before the reform to 0.48 percent after, but the foreclosure rate for the near-
elderly rose more, from 0.54 percent to 0.68 percent.  Because the absolute increase for the elderly 
was smaller than for the near-elderly, the difference-in-difference is negative, or -0.08 percentage 
points.  The negative result is again consistent with our prediction and it implies that bankruptcy 
reform caused the proportion of foreclosure starts affecting the elderly to fall.     
Next we turn to the financial crisis. The top panel of Table 2 shows the same information 
for bankruptcy filing rates before versus after the financial crisis. Bankruptcy rates increased 
sharply for both groups following the crisis:  the increase for the elderly was from 0.18 percent per 
year before the crisis to 0.26 percent after, or by 0.08 percentage points; while the increase for the 
near-elderly was from 0.38 percent per year to 0.66 percent, or by 0.28 percentage points.  In 
percentage terms, these increases are 48 percent for the elderly versus 75 percent for the near-
elderly.  Because the absolute increase for the elderly was smaller, the diff-in-diff is negative, or -
0.20 percentage points.  This result supports our prediction that the financial crisis caused the 
proportion of bankruptcy filings by the elderly to fall, because their bankruptcy filing rate 
increased by less than that of the near-elderly.    
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Table 2 here  
The bottom panel of Table 2 shows the change in foreclosure rates before versus after the 
financial crisis.  Foreclosure rates of the elderly increased from 0.48 percent per year before the 
crisis to 0.83 percent afterwards, or by 0.35 percentage points, while the foreclosure rates of the 
near-elderly increased sharply from 0.76 percent per year before the crisis to 1.6 percent after, or 
by 0.82 percentage points.  Because the increase for the elderly was smaller, the diff-in-diff is -
0.47 percentage points.  This result again supports our prediction that the financial crisis had less 
negative effects on the elderly than the near-elderly, resulting in a fall in the proportion of 
foreclosures affecting the elderly.  Note that both of the diff-in-diff terms for the financial crisis 
are large in absolute terms—they are as large as the pre-crisis absolute bankruptcy and foreclosure 
rates for the elderly.       
The large size of the difference terms suggests that bankruptcy reform and the financial 
crisis had large negative effects on both the elderly and the near-elderly.  Nevertheless, the 
difference-in-difference terms suggest that these negative effects were smaller for the elderly than 
the near-elderly.     
 
Regression Specification and Results 
 Next we run probit regressions that repeat the calculations, but we now add other controls.  
The specification is a difference-in-difference regression, where we define Y_it as a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if individual i files for bankruptcy in quarter t and 0 otherwise.  Moreover, 
Post_t is equal to 1 in the period after bankruptcy reform and zero before; Elderly_i is equal to 1 
for the elderly and 0 for the near-elderly; and Z_it is a vector of control variables.  The controls 
consist of individual i’s bank card debt, auto loan debt, and mortgage debt, all lagged one quarter 
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and deflated to 2004 dollars, and dummies for individual i’s Risk Score in categories, with the 
lowest score category omitted.  We also include fixed effects for individuals’ age in years and for 
state of residence.  ε_it  is the error term. We estimate the following model:     
Y_it = a + b(Post_t) + c(Elderly_i*Post_t) + d(Z_it) + ε_it   
The difference-in-difference term is c.  Errors are clustered by individual.16  The sample and time 
period are the same as discussed above for the raw difference-in-difference calculations.  We use 
probit for this and all regressions.  
 Additionally we run a regression explaining foreclosure starts before versus after the 2005 
bankruptcy reform.  The specification is the same as above, except that now Y_it is redefined to 
be a dummy equal to 1 if foreclosure started for individual i in quarter t and zero otherwise.  The 
time period and sample are the same as discussed above for the raw difference-in-difference 
calculations in Table 1, lower panel.     
We use the same specification for regressions analyzing the effect of the 2008 financial 
crisis.   Here Y_it is either a dummy for whether individual i filed for bankruptcy in quarter t or a 
dummy for whether foreclosure started for individual i in quarter t and Post_t is a dummy for the 
period after the financial crisis. The time period and samples are the same as for the raw difference-
in-difference calculations in Table 2.     
Table 3 shows the results of the regressions explaining bankruptcy filings and foreclosure 
starts for the bankruptcy reform sample, and p-values are in parentheses.  In column (1) explaining 
bankruptcy filings, the Post variable is negative and significant, reflecting the fact that bankruptcy 
filings by both the elderly and the near-elderly dropped after the reform.  The diff-in-diff term is 
positive as predicted and statistically significant at the 10 percent level (p = .075). Yet both 
variables are extremely small: they suggest that filings by the elderly dropped by 0.05 percentage 
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points, while filings by the near-elderly dropped by 0.06 percentage points. These results suggest 
that much of the effect of bankruptcy reform seen in Table 1 is accounted for by individual 
characteristics, rather than by the reform.                     
Table 3 here  
The bankcard and auto debt variables have the predicted positive signs and are highly 
significant, but mortgage debt is negatively rather than positively related to the probability of  
bankruptcy—probably because only homeowners have mortgages and homeowners are less likely 
to file for bankruptcy than renters.          
The second column of Table 3 shows the results of the regression explaining the effect of 
bankruptcy reform on the number of foreclosure starts.  Here, the Post variable is positive as 
predicted, but it is even smaller than in the regression explaining bankruptcy filings.  The diff-in-
diff coefficient has a positive rather than the predicted negative sign, but it is extremely small and 
insignificant. As a result, we conclude that bankruptcy reform raised foreclosure start rates for both 
the elderly and the near-elderly, but the effects were extremely small and did not differ 
significantly between the two groups.   
We turn now to the results of the financial crisis regressions, shown in Table 4.  Column 1 
shows the results of the regression explaining bankruptcy filings. The Post coefficient has the 
predicted positive sign, the diff-in-diff term has the predicted negative sign, and both are at least 
marginally significant but they are extremely small.  Similarly, column 2 explaining foreclosure 
starts has a Post coefficient with the predicted positive sign and the diff-in-diff term is negative, 
but the latter is insignificant and both are extremely small.   
Table 4 here  
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One possible explanation for the small size of the diff-in-diff coefficients in Tables 3 and 
4 is that events such as bankruptcy reform or the financial crisis may cause financial distress that 
becomes worse over time as debt gradually builds up, but may only lead to bankruptcy or 
foreclosure after several years.  Thus our time periods might be too short to capture the full effects 
of bankruptcy reform or the financial crisis, leading to small and/or insignificant coefficients for 
the Post and Elderly*Post terms.   
To test this possibility, we reran our models using a much longer time period extending 
from 2000Q1 to 2012Q4.  To capture the effect of bankruptcy reform, we use an interaction term 
between being elderly and the period after bankruptcy reform, Elderly_i*Post-Reform_t; to 
capture the effect of the financial crisis, we use a separate interaction between being elderly and 
the post-financial crisis period, Elderly_i*Post-Crisis_t.  We also drop the Post_t variable and 
introduce quarterly fixed effects.  We again drop the period around bankruptcy reform from 
2005Q3 to 2006Q1, but otherwise the specification remains the same.  We predict that if the effects 
of bankruptcy reform and/or the financial crisis grew worse over a multi-year period before leading 
to bankruptcy or foreclosure, then the coefficients of the interaction terms will be larger and more 
significant than in the shorter period regressions.  
Results are shown in Table 5. Surprisingly, all of the interaction terms remain 
approximately the same magnitude.  For example, the Elderly*Post-Reform coefficient in the 
regression explaining bankruptcy filings was 0.00011 in Table 3 and 0.00014 in Table 5, while the 
Elderly*Post-Crisis coefficient in the regression explaining foreclosure starts was -0.000022 in 
Table 4 compared to -0.000024 in Table 5; neither was significant.  In other words, for the longer 
period regressions, the result is again that there was little difference between how the elderly versus 
the near-elderly responded to the 2005 bankruptcy reform or the 2008 financial crisis.     
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Table 5 here  
Another possible explanation for the small size of the difference and diff-in-diff terms in 
the regressions is that individual debt and risk characteristics variables could indirectly capture the 
effects of bankruptcy reform or the financial crisis.  Suppose that some individuals became 
financially distressed following the financial crisis due to job loss.  As a result, their debt levels 
rose and their risk scores fell.  Since our debt variables are lagged only one quarter and our risk 
score categories reflect conditions only a month or two earlier, these variables change in response 
to the financial crisis and may therefore be correlated with our Post and Post*Elderly variables, 
partially capturing the effect of the financial crisis.  If so, then the size and significance of our 
estimated Post and Post*Elderly coefficients will fall.  The same could be the case in our analysis 
of bankruptcy reform.  In other words, while our raw difference and diff-in-diff results may be 
overestimates of the effects of bankruptcy reform and the financial crisis, our estimated difference 
and diff-in-diff results may be underestimates of the same effects.         
 
Conclusions 
   Our analysis suggests that both the 2005 bankruptcy reform and the 2008 financial crisis 
had large effects on the number of bankruptcy filings and foreclosure starts, both of which are 
important indicators of financial distress. The 2005 bankruptcy reform caused the number of 
bankruptcy filings to fall sharply and the number of foreclosures to rise, implying that fewer 
debtors used bankruptcy to obtain relief from financial distress and that bankruptcy declined as a 
mechanism to help homeowners avoid foreclosure.  The 2008 financial crisis caused the number 
of bankruptcy filings and the number of foreclosure starts to rise, implying a general increase in 
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financial distress. Nevertheless, our economic analysis implies that the elderly were less negatively 
affected by both the reform and the financial crisis than younger age groups.   
The data support these predictions: following bankruptcy reform, the decline in elderly 
bankruptcy filings was smaller than for the near-elderly, but bankruptcy filings by both groups 
increased. Also in line with predictions, the 2008 financial crisis caused a smaller increase in 
bankruptcy filings by the elderly than the near-elderly, so that the proportion of filings by the 
elderly fell.  Both bankruptcy reform and the financial crisis also caused an increase in the number 
of foreclosure starts by both groups, but the increase for the elderly was smaller.  This means that 
the proportion of foreclosure starts affecting the elderly fell after both bankruptcy reform and the 
financial crisis.  Our results suggest that, while both bankruptcy reform and the financial crisis 
made debtors significantly worse off, the impact on the elderly was smaller than on younger 
individuals. Therefore neither bankruptcy reform nor the financial crisis can explain the rise in 
financial distress of the elderly relative to younger age groups.      
Nevertheless, the regression results highlight some additional nuances. In particularly, they 
suggest that the overall effects of bankruptcy reform and the financial crisis were not particularly 
negative for either group, and they did not alter outcomes for the elderly versus near-elderly.  
Specifically, the regression analysis corrects for individual debt characteristics which themselves 
were negatively affected by bankruptcy reform and the financial crisis.  In any event, we conclude 
that bankruptcy reform and the financial crisis cannot explain the increasing financial distress of 





The views expressed in this paper are the authors’ and do not represent the views of the 
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1 Our data are from the FRBNY Consumer Credit Panel/Equifax Data (CCP).  See the next section 
for discussion.  
2 The proportion of the population age 65-85 as a share of the population age 20-85 rose from 17.3 
percent in 2000 to 20.6 percent in 2018.      
3 These figures reflect the number of foreclosure starts affecting elderly homeowners as a 
proportion of all foreclosure starts.  Note that not all foreclosure starts become completed 
foreclosures, because homeowners may stop foreclosure by paying off their mortgage arrears, 
agreeing to a repayment plan with the lender, or making an agreement with the lender to walk 
away from the property—a short sale. 
4 The reform was the ‘Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005’ 
(Pub.L. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23, enacted April 20, 2005).  
5 The CCP excludes individuals who do not have social security numbers and those who have no 
credit history, because they never applied for or qualified for a loan or a credit card.  But 
individuals are covered for 10 years if they applied for a loan or credit card in the past.  See Lee 
and van der Klaauw (2010) for discussion. 
6 Payday loans are not covered because payday lenders do not report information to Equifax.  
Because payday lenders are excluded, individuals who have only payday loans are excluded from 
the sample unless they have another type of loan or had one in the past.    
7 Bankruptcy filings include filings under both Chapters 7 and 13.     
8 The CCP underrepresents 20-24 year olds, in part because legislation prevents credit bureaus 
from setting up files for college-age students and also because many young people do not have 
credit.   In the CCP, the share of 20-24 year olds declined from 8 percent to 6.7 percent between 
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2000 to 2018, while the share of this group in the population remained at around 9.5 percent over 
the same period.    
9 See White (1998) for calculations showing that up to one-third of US households could have 
benefitted financially from filing for bankruptcy under the pre-2005 bankruptcy law.   
10 For discussion of how bankruptcy helps homeowners, see White and Zhu (2010) and Li et al. 
(2019).  For general discussion of bankruptcy law and the 2005 bankruptcy reform, see White 
(2011). 
11 Since the 2005 bankruptcy reform, bankruptcy filings have peaked in March of each year, 
suggesting that many filers are deterred by the high costs of filing and delay until they receive their 
tax refunds.; see US Courts (2018).    
12 Federal government student loans became non-dischargeable except in cases of ‘undue hardship’ 
in 1997 and the 2005 bankruptcy reform also made private educational loans non-dischargeable.    
13 For discussion of foreclosure, incentives for mortgage default, and the effect of the financial 
crisis, see Gerardi et al. (2007), Mayer et al. (2009), Elul et al. (2010), Jiang et al. (2014) and 
Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2011).  
14 We have argued elsewhere that the 2005 bankruptcy reform caused the financial crisis in part, 
by making bankruptcy less favorable to debtors and therefore causing mortgage defaults to rise 
even before the onset of the financial crisis (Li et al. 2011).   
15 The reform went into effect in October 2005.  





Figure 1.  Elderly Share of Bankruptcy Filings and Foreclosure Starts 
 























Figure 2.  Bankcard and Mortgage Debt of the Elderly (65-85) Relative to the Near-Elderly (45-
64) 
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Table 1.  Annual bankruptcy filing and foreclosure rates for the elderly versus the near-elderly, 
before and after the 2005 bankruptcy reform (2003Q3-2005Q1, 2006Q2-2007Q4)  
  
Bankruptcy filing rates:  
  Before reform  After reform Difference 
Elderly (65-85) 0.0035  0.0016 -0.0019 (-54%) 
Near-elderly (45-64) 0.0084  0.0035 -0.0050 (-59%) 





 Foreclosure rates:  
  Before reform  After reform Difference 
Elderly (65-85) 0.0041  0.0048 0.0007 (17%) 
Near-elderly (45-64) 0.0054 0.0069 0.0014 (26%) 








Table 2.  Annual bankruptcy filing rates and foreclosure rates for the elderly versus the near-
elderly, before and after the 2008 financial crisis (2006Q3-2009Q4) 
  
 Bankruptcy filing rates:  
  Before crisis  After crisis Difference  
Elderly (65-85) 0.0018   0.0026 0.0008 (48%) 
Near-elderly (45-64) 0.0038   0.0066  0.0028 (74%) 





Foreclosure rates:   
  Before crisis  After crisis Difference  
Elderly (65-85) 0.0048 0.0083 0.0035 (74%) 
Near-elderly (45-64) 0.0076  0.016 0.0083 (108%) 




Source:  FRBNY Consumer Credit Panel/Equifax Data, years indicated.   
25 
 
Table 3. Results of probit regressions explaining annual bankruptcy filings and foreclosure 






















Source:  FRBNY Consumer Credit Panel/Equifax Data, years indicated.   
  
 Bankruptcy filings 
(1) 
Foreclosure starts   
(2) 




























Risk categories X X 
Age fixed effects X X 
State fixed effects X X 
N 4.2 million 1.7 million 








Table 4.  Results of probit regressions explaining annual bankruptcy filings and foreclosure 
starts, before and after the 2008 financial crisis (2006Q3-2009Q4)  
 































Risk categories X X 
Age fixed effects X X 
State fixed effects X X 
N 3.9 million 1.7 million 
Time period 2006Q3-2009Q4 2006Q3-2009Q4 
 
Note: Figures are marginal effects, with p values in parentheses. 
 




   
Table 5.  Results of probit regressions explaining annual bankruptcy filings and foreclosure 

















Note: Figures are marginal effects, with p values in parentheses. 
 
Source:  FRBNY Consumer Credit Panel/Equifax Data, years indicated.   
  
































Age fixed effects X X 
State fixed effects X X 
Quarter fixed effects X X 
N 13.2 million 5.4 million 








Appendix Table 1.  Summary Statistics  
 
 Bankruptcy reform sample Financial crisis sample 
 Bankruptcy  Foreclosure 
start   
Bankruptcy  Foreclosure 























































































Note: Figures are means, with standard deviations in parentheses.  The foreclosure start samples 
include only individuals with positive mortgage debt. 
 
Source:  FRBNY Consumer Credit Panel/Equifax Data, years indicated.   
 
 
